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In recent years, the role of internationalism in the interpretation 
of the Constitution of the United States has flared up, yet again.  This 
time, the discussion takes place within a larger jurisprudential mael-
strom: the assertion of “originalism” as a viable—if not the only legi-
timate—approach to constitutional interpretation.  While originalists 
                                                                                                                           
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.  Co-Director, Center for Hispanic 
& Caribbean Legal Studies.  I thank the Dean and faculty for inviting my participation in this 
event and symposium.  I am especially grateful to participate because of the occasion they mark: 
the inauguration of the facilities for the Florida International University College of Law.  Be-
cause I arrived in Miami from Cuba when I was a mere five years of age, I consider this effective-
ly my “hometown.”  Therefore, I am delighted to witness this day, when a public law school (fi-
nally) becomes a reality in this community.  With the substantive note struck by this inauguration 
and symposium, I hope and trust that internationalism will flourish here for many years to come.  
All errors below are mine.  
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have painted differing portraits of their view(s), a common and bed-
rock tenet is that the federal Constitution must be viewed through the 
Framers’ subjective prism: in other words, what the original Framers 
“intended”—or what the sitting judges think “they” intended.1    Tak-
ing originalism seriously thus invites, or compels, that we consider the 
Framers’ original methods, or approaches, to constitutionalism itself—
to the process of forging constitutional meanings, including the role 
and relevance of comparative and international analysis, or interna-
tionalism.2   
A review of the known historical record quickly shows the origi-
nal generation embracing internationalism as constitutional method.  
Though the notion of a stable, unitary, collective “intent” among the 
framers of the Constitution on any given detail is conceptually incohe-
rent, key figures among those at the Constitutional Convention rou-
tinely and deliberately turned to other societies’ experiences for in-
sight and guidance.  Time and again the Framers and their contempo-
raries drew comparative lessons intentionally for “domestic” applica-
tion.3  If we take originalism seriously, intellectual honesty requires us 
to take internationalism seriously.  
It thus seems ironic—perhaps Orwellian—that adherents of ori-
ginalism would be among the most strident enemies of international-
ism as constitutional method.4  This discontinuity suggests a substan-
tive incoherence in the elaboration of originalism as a serious ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation.  This discontinuity further sug-
gests an unprincipled application of originalism’s basic tenets to at-
tempt justification of an anti-internationalist stance.  But to what end?  
If strategic, this discontinuity raises doubts not only about the concep-
tual viability of originalism in the longer term, but also about the rule 
of law in the United States under the rule of self-styled “originalist” 
judges.   
                                                                                                                           
 1 See infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text (on “intent” in constitutional interpreta-
tion).  
 2 In this brief Essay I sometimes refer to “internationalism” as shorthand for the varied 
kinds of materials and uses that could be imagined in a discussion of this symposium’s topic.  Of 
course, the specific materials or uses can help determine doctrinal or detailed analysis of a par-
ticular substantive issue, but the focus of this Essay is not on technical analysis.   Instead, this 
Essay attempts to situate the current sense of controversy regarding this topic against the broad-
er sociolegal and sociopolitical background of this historical moment, and to do so in a way that 
validates and celebrates the internationalist mission of this institution.  See infra notes 44-72 and 
accompanying text (amplifying these points). 
 3 See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (on internationalism in original and early 
practices). 
 4 See infra notes 34-51 and 66-72 and accompanying text (on relationship between origi-
nalism and anti-internationalism today). 
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Because the federal judiciary generally, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court specifically, are under the influence of judges who profess alle-
giance to originalism,5 the questions and doubts raised by this discon-
tinuity are of enormous import to anyone interested in the preserva-
tion of constitutional governance in the United States. And as this 
symposium illustrates, the role of internationalism in U.S. legal culture 
remains alive.  Indeed, internationalism in and through legal culture is 
central to the legislative mandate for this university as a whole.6  With 
                                                                                                                           
 5 As elaborated below, the past several decades have witnessed a sweeping recomposition 
of the federal judiciary along increasingly politicized lines.  See infra notes 53-65 and sources 
cited therein (on the jurisprudential politics of the culture wars).  See generally RICHARD 
HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 33-45 (1980) (on the politics 
of the Nixon nominations to the Supreme Court).  For other accounts covering recent decades, 
see DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 56-86 
(2000); RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S AGENDA: 
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1991); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER (1991); HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE 
COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION (1988); Francisco 
Valdes, Culture, “Kulturkampf” and Beyond: The Antidiscrimination Principle Under the Juri-
sprudence of Backlash, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 271, 287-91 
(Austin Sarat ed., 2004), (providing an extensive bibliography on the general topic).   
This intensification of politics in judicial appointments became most noticeable during the 
Reagan administrations.   See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan’s Judicial Appointments at Mid-Term: 
Shaping the Bench in His Own Image, 66 JUDICATURE 335 (1983); Jon Gottschall, Reagan’s 
Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 
JUDICATURE 48 (1986-87); Sheldon Goldman, Reagan’s Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle 
and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318 (1986) (all on President Reagan’s judicial appointments 
and their ideological effects on the federal judiciary).  By the turn of the century, President Rea-
gan’s escalated ideological scrutiny and techniques to ensure ideological purity had produced a 
paralyzing polarization in the confirmation process, especially in election years: in 1988, when 
Ronald Reagan faced a Democratic Senate, the senators approved 42 of his judicial nominees; in 
1992, when George Bush similarly faced a Democratic Senate, the senators approved 66 of his 
judicial nominees; in 1996, when Bill Clinton faced a Republican Senate, the senators approved a 
mere 17 of his judicial nominees.  See Frank Davies, Senate Stalling New Judges: Republicans 
Block New Judgeships, MIA. HERALD, Feb. 6, 2000, at 1A (reporting the increased blocking of 
federal judicial appointments on ideological grounds). 
However, the same rhetoric and campaign continues to this day, as the daily news reports 
demonstrate.  E.g., Elizabeth Bumiller, Bush Vows to Seek Conservative Judges, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 29, 2002, at A24; Robert A. Carp, Kenneth L. Manning & Ronald Stidham, The Decision-
Making Behavior of George W. Bush’s Judicial Appointees: Far-Right, Conservative or Moderate? 
88 JUDICATURE 20 (2004) (reporting that overall voting patterns indicate that the most recent 
appointees “are among the most conservative on record”). 
 6 Among the three goals for the establishment of Florida International University was 
“greater international    understanding.”  In particular, the intent behind this goal was, “to be-
come a major international education center with a primary emphasis on creating greater mutual 
understanding among the Americas and throughout the world.”  See, THE STATE UNIVERSITY 
SYSTEM OF FLORIDA, THE BIRTH OF A UNIVERSITY:  FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
AND PLANS FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT, 13 (1972).   To carry out this goal, the university was 
charged with development of “special programs and capabilities to serve the citizens and gov-
ernments of the Americas and of the world.”  Id at 16.  To accomplish this goal, the university 
was also charged with cultivating a faculty, student body, and other resources to “optimize” this 
mandate.  Id at 17.  On a different but related point the Florida Legislature chartered the Col-
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these general and specific circumstances in mind, this Essay explores 
these themes to help clarify not only the current fuss over the proper 
role of internationalism in constitutional interpretation, but also to 
help clarify the larger jurisprudential backdrop that frames and fuels 
it.  As we shall see, this inquiry leads to the three-way intersection of 
strategic legal isolationism, “originalism” and the culture wars.   
To begin with, consider this:  
Powerful and ingenious minds, taking, as postulates, that 
the powers expressly granted to the government of the 
Union, are to be contracted by construction, into the nar-
rowest possible compass, and that the original powers of 
the States are retained, if any possible construction will 
retain them, may, by a course of well digested, but refined 
and metaphysical reasoning, founded on these premises, 
explain away the constitution of our country, and leave it, 
a magnificent structure, indeed, to look at, but totally un-
fit for use.  They may so entangle and perplex the under-
standing, as to obscure principles, which were before 
thought quite plain, and induce doubts where, if the mind 
were to pursue its own course, none would be perceived.7 
John Marshall wrote these compelling words during the nation’s in-
fancy.  What is the prescription in such a case?  According to Chief 
Justice Marshall, writing in 1824 for the Court:  “In such a case, it is 
peculiarly necessary to recur to safe and fundamental principles to 
sustain those principles, and when sustained, to make them the tests of 
the arguments to be examined.”8  
I propose that we do that today: I propose that we heed that orig-
inal advice, and follow original method, as we consider the topic of 
this symposium.   
To do so, this Essay endeavors to bring into focus a triangular lin-
kage that helps explain what today’s anti-internationalist fuss is all 
about.  The first linkage is the connection between “originalism” and 
the role of international or foreign materials in the interpretation of 
the federal Constitution.9  The second linkage is the relationship be-
tween originalism and the sociolegal struggles of the present time and 
                                                                                                                           
lege of Law of this university, whose facilities we inaugurate today with this symposium, in order 
to promote the access of social minorities to legal education and law practice.  See, FL ST § 
240.7101 (2000). 
 7 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222 (1824) (striking down inter-state ferry licens-
ing laws in conflict with federal commerce powers). 
 8 Id.  
 9 See infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text (on this interconnection). 
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the past half century or so, which in recent years have increasingly 
become known as the “culture wars” of North America.10  The third 
linkage brings the inquiry back full circle, to the interconnections be-
tween the specific fuss over internationalism and the more general 
noise created by cultural warfare.11  The pivot point in this three-way 
linkage thus appears to be originalism itself.  Yet, originalism is itself 
also a product of the same forces and dynamics that help to set up the 
larger dynamics of cultural warfare.  Therefore, though originalism 
appears as the pivot point in this analysis, we must always keep in 
mind that the cross-relationships binding originalism to the other two 
points of this triangular linkage are dialectical, fluid and mutually 
reinforcing: not only does originalism help to beget the problems and 
controversies addressed below, but they, in turn, help to animate and 
organize the jurisprudential backlash that has formed, most recently 
under the rubric of originalism, since the late 1930s and up to this very 
moment.12 
The first step in this effort, in Part I below, is to acknowledge the 
history of uses of international or foreign materials in the interpreta-
tion of the Constitution, from before the founding to the present.  
With this historical context in place, the second step, in Part II, is to 
situate the current fuss in its contemporary jurisprudential context.  
Only after this effort can we begin to consider seriously, in Part III, the 
legitimate questions that this topic entails.  Along the way, this analysis 
shows that internationalism as constitutional method is not only per-
missible, but also fully compatible with original method—method that 
effectively amounted to comparative and critical theorizing about the 
design and operation of constitutionalism in a heterogeneous, com-
mercial and representative democracy. 
I. “FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS”: HISTORY 
AND BEYOND  
Substantively and conceptually, this topic raises at least four sets 
of definitional questions.  The first of these focuses on the nature of 
the materials themselves; that is, the kinds of “foreign and interna-
tional” materials under discussion.  These materials can be defined 
broadly or narrowly, including foreign court and international court 
decisions interpreting domestic or international law, such as terms of 
treaties and similar agreements, or of customary international law, and 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See infra notes 50-66 and accompanying text (on this linkage). 
 11 See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (on this relationship). 
 12 See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (on New Deal showdown between the 
President and the judges). 
6 FIU Law Review [3:1 
the like.13  The second set of questions involves time, or timing—when 
in time are these materials, however defined, being used? These ques-
tions focus on the distinction, if any, between framing and interpreting 
a Constitution.14  The third set of questions focuses on the uses or ap-
plications of these materials.  These questions focus on whether the 
materials are used in a primary way, where they serve as the principal 
basis or rationale for the determination of a point of law, or in a sec-
ondary way, in which they are used to supplement the rationale for a 
determination or conclusion.15  And finally, the fourth category of 
questions focuses on who is using these materials, however defined, 
and at whichever point in time.  Thus, this fourth category of questions 
focuses on who the legal actor is, in a structural or institutional 
sense—a Framer, a judge, or an elected official?16  The answers to 
these questions can help to establish parameters for a doctrinal or 
technical analysis, but the underlying point is that the original practic-
es of the Framers and their generation in fact scrambled across the 
various categories suggested by any given answer to these (and simi-
lar) questions.17  
Since then, full-fledged articles have been, and will be, written on 
the various ways in which these kinds of questions may be re-framed 
and re-answered.18  This brief Essay is not devoted to a review of these 
extensive materials, nor to a microscopic dissection of any portion of 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See, e.g., Osmar J. Benvenuto, Note, Reevaluating the Debate Surrounding the Supreme 
Court’s Use of Foreign Precedent, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2695, 2700-03 (2006) (reviewing the sub-
categories of materials and uses). 
 14 See infra note 33 (on the distinction). 
 15 See infra notes 19-33 and accompanying text (on traditional uses of these kinds of 
sources or analysis). 
 16 The focus in this Essay is on the Framers during the founding, and on judges since, due 
to their written record in the form of published opinions.  See infra notes 17-33 and accompany-
ing text (on judicial uses since the Founding). 
 17 In other words, the practices of the original generation cannot be tidily contained within 
any given category.  See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text (on the history of international-
ist and comparativist practices since the founding).   
 18 The various articles cited throughout this Essay provide one good sampler.  For other informa-
tive examples, see generally Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 
(1997); Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639 
(2004-2005); Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources  to Interpret the Constitution, 9 AM. J. OF 
INT’L L. 57 (2004); Donald E. Childress III, Note, Using Comparative Constitutional Law to Resolve 
Domestic Federal Questions, 53 DUKE L. J. 193 (2003-2004); Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search 
of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L. J. 819 (1998-
1999); Samuel C. Kaplan, “Grab Bag of Principles” or Principled Grab Bag?: The Constitutionaliza-
tion of Common Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 463 (1997-1998); Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of 
Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499 (2000); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional 
Rights, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1999 (2002-2003); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). 
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them.  Instead, this Essay aims to use and celebrate those materials, 
and the insights they provide, as a point of departure for consideration 
of the focus that this symposium invites:  what is the proper role of 
internationalism in the legal culture of this nation, and why?  As we 
approach this topic and the current fuss over it, we might do well to 
begin at the beginning of this story.   
Historically, the Framers set a fairly straightforward example, 
employing comparative study repeatedly before their framing of the 
Constitution, during their actual composition of the Constitution, and 
after the completion of the framing, while in the process of ratifica-
tion.19  The founding generation more broadly did likewise: that is, not 
only the Framers in Philadelphia in 1787, not only those privileged 
actors able to participate in the post-Philadelphia state ratifying con-
ventions, but also the people who lived at that time, and in particular, 
the judges of that original generation, who originally interpreted the 
handiwork of their contemporaries, and who left a relatively clear 
record in the form of their published opinions.20  The founding genera-
tion, including the Framers, turned to comparative study to try to give 
meaning to constitutionalism, writ large, in the United States after, as 
well as before, having framed that document.   
Moreover, since that original generation, successive generations 
of judges of all political stripes, appointed by politicians of all political 
persuasions, have done the same.21  They have done so, in the early 
parts of the Republic, up until around the Civil War, while focusing on 
the rights of the sovereign, the “law of nations”—what “civilized” na-
tions thought were the “rights” of sovereigns.  Since the Civil War, and 
up until around the New Deal, and thereafter, especially after World 
War II, the focus has shifted: the focus of comparativism in United 
States constitutionalism, since the mid-twentieth century, has shifted 
from elaborating the powers of sovereigns under the Constitution to 
elaborating the rights of the sovereigns’ subjects under the same doc-
ument.  That is, a focus toward civil and human rights that limit the 
power of sovereigns.  In both of these periods—whether focusing on 
sovereigns or subjects—comparative judicial methodologies have al-
                                                                                                                           
 19 One telling example is the Federalist Papers, which used comparativist and internatio-
nalist argumentation to explain the substantive contents of the Constitution to urge its ratifica-
tion.  E.g., David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 
580 n. 194 (2001-2002) (providing examples). 
 20 The various illustrative cases discussed in this Essay provide some examples.  For addi-
tional ones, see infra note 22 and sources cited therein (on the uses of these materials over histo-
ry). 
 21 For an extensive review, see Fontana, supra note 19, at 574-90 (tracing comparativist 
practices from the founding to the present, by framers, judges, and other public figures).  
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ways been part and parcel of constitutional practice in the United 
States.22  
In the early years of the country, before the Civil War, this long 
and varied history is exemplified by the multiple pronouncements of 
the individual justices in the 1857 case of Dred Scott.23  In that case, the 
judges upheld the institution of slavery and invalidated a congression-
al statute prohibiting it in certain areas of the United States.  To arrive 
at that result, the judges, as is often times the case, relied on many 
standard sources of constitutional meaning, including text, intent, and 
doctrine.  Among those sources were repeated references to interna-
tional and comparative materials, oftentimes phrased in terms of “civi-
lization” or God or nature.24  These references, moreover, were not 
limited to the judges in the majority.  On the contrary, the dissenting 
judges also relied on foreign and international materials, in similar 
ways, to arrive at the diametrically opposite conclusion in that case.  
Indeed, a careful examination of the voluminous writings of the judges 
in that case can serve as a mini-case study in the varied uses of inter-
national and foreign materials in the interpretation of the United 
States Constitution.  And, as these multiple opinions vividly illustrate 
these uses can produce strikingly opposing results.25   
Within two decades, the Supreme Court again made law while us-
ing comparativist and internationalist analysis in the case of Bradwell 
v. State of Illinois.26  In that 1872 case, the judges concluded that states 
like Illinois could enact statutes prohibiting women like Bradwell 
from the practice of law, in part because “female attorneys at law were 
unknown in England” and because “God designed the sexes to occupy 
different spheres of action . . . it belonged to men to make, apply, and 
execute the laws.”27  These kinds of globalized, grandiose references to 
custom, history, tradition, religion and God illustrate how transnation-
al or international frameworks were routinely used by federal judges 
at the highest levels as a form of juridical comparativism to help justi-
                                                                                                                           
 22 E.g., Fontana, supra note 19.  For other excellent reviews of historical practices since the 
founding, see Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 
98 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 82 (2004); David M. O’Brien, More Smoke than Fire: The Rehnquist Courts 
use of Comparative Judicial Opinions and Law in the Construction of Constitutional Rights, 22 J. 
L. & POL. 83 (2006).   
 23 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 477-86 (1857). 
 24 For an insightful review, see Mark W. Janis, Dred Scott and International Law, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 763 (2004-2005). 
 25 Id. at 782-808 (elaborating a detailed review of international or comparative analysis in 
each of the opinions in that case, including their varied, even contradictory, conclusions). 
 26 83 U.S. 130 (1872).  
 27 Id. at 132, quoting and affirming Supreme Court of Illinois. 
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fy rulings interpreting the Constitution and “domestic” state or feder-
al laws. 
In modern times, another notorious ruling illustrates the same ba-
sic points.  In the 1986 case of Bowers v. Hardwick, 28 the judges of the 
Supreme Court upheld a state statute outlawing all sexual relations 
other than traditional intercourse, as applied to a same-sex couple.  
Again, to arrive at that result, the judges appealed to various kinds of 
sources to interpret and apply the Constitution, including precedent, 
history and intent.  Again, among those, were globalized appeals to 
comparative and international sources.29  Thus, in this case we see a 
continuation of the practices exemplified in Dred Scott and Bradwell. 
Most recently, in the 2003 case of Lawrence v. Texas,30 the Su-
preme Court reversed its ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick, once again 
replicating the same basic scenario.  In Lawrence, the judges invali-
dated a state statute specifically focused on prohibiting same-sex sod-
omy.  To do so, the judges again relied on multiple sources of interpre-
tation.  Once again, among those sources we find international and 
foreign materials.31  Thus, each of these four well-known cases, span-
ning most of the nation’s history, help to bring into focus some basic 
patterns regarding the uses of international and foreign materials in 
U.S. constitutional cases. 
This quartet of cases show that judges appointed during different 
times by different politicians have relied on international or compara-
tive analysis at least from time to time, and with little or no fanfare.  
Apparently, none of them subscribed to an absolute or categorical 
exclusion of comparativst analysis in constitutional interpretation and 
adjudication.  In addition, we see in this quartet how different judges 
tend to commonly employ international or foreign materials in a sec-
ondary manner; that is, in a manner that reinforces or supplements a 
determination or conclusion already driven principally by other 
sources of interpretation.32  Usually, then, international and compara-
tive analysis serves to confirm or corroborate a conclusion that is sug-
gested or demanded by other sources considered more controlling.   
Finally, this high-profile quartet illustrates how the same metho-
dology—international or comparative analysis—can be deployed to 
                                                                                                                           
 28 478 U.S. 186 (1986).   
 29 Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing to Christian history, traditions and civiliza-
tion, chiefly in European countries, to help interpret Fourteenth Amendment). 
 30 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 31 Id. at 574-78 (reviewing international, and other, sociolegal developments to help interp-
ret the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 32 In each case, the judges cited to positive texts, precedents and doctrine, as well as intent 
or purpose, and other standard sources of interpretation in adjudication.  See supra notes 23-31 
and sources cited (on these cases). 
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achieve diametrically opposed results when measured in ideological 
or political terms.  These cases thus show that internationalist or com-
parativist approaches to interpretation serve no fixed ideological mas-
ter; the method is available to judicial appointees of different political 
persuasions, and can be used willfully as tools to help accomplish pre-
ferred results.  At a minimum, the multiple opinions in these cases 
display that employment of international or comparative sources in 
constitutional interpretation is neither new nor novel, regardless of 
political or jurisprudential affiliations. 
In sum, it is fair to say that international and foreign materials, 
whether broadly or narrowly defined, have seen their use in United 
States Supreme Court’s and other courts’ decisions in many permuta-
tions.  As we have seen in cases such as Dred Scott, Bowers, and Law-
rence, Supreme Court justices throughout the nation’s history have 
invoked “foreign and international” sources—whether defined broad-
ly or narrowly—to create the boundaries of individual rights, as well 
as the powers of sovereign, in the name of the Law, and specifically of 
the Constitution.  In doing so, these Supreme Court justices have fol-
lowed the examples set by the Framers specifically, and by the found-
ing generation more broadly.  Those original examples show that “for-
eign and international materials”—defined both narrowly and broad-
ly—were incorporated in extremely conscious ways into the substance 
and design of the Constitution and later, after its adoption, again in 
formal interpretive acts. 33  In some cases, we may find the results 
agreeable; in other cases, we will find the results disagreeable; in all 
cases, however, the methodology has been relatively clear: judicial 
appointees since the founding have repeatedly relied on international 
and foreign materials in the performance of their formal adjudicative 
acts under the Constitution of the United States.  Thus, in the face of 
diverse results, we find a record that is both regular and modest: typi-
cally, whether in elaborating the rights of the sovereign, or the indi-
vidual, comparativism in U.S. constitutionalism has served as a back-
up rationale, sometimes even as a throw-a-way line.   
So, one might reasonably ask: “What’s the big fuss all about, all of 
a sudden?”  
                                                                                                                           
 33 Scalia famously makes a distinction between framing and interpreting a Constitution, 
but the distinction is made as a conclusory assertion that, to me, is not at all self-evident.  See, 
e.g., Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen 
Breyer 23 (Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions), AU Washington College of 
Law, Jan. 13, 2005.  Apparently, the distinction also was not self-evident to generations of judges 
throughout the nation’s history, whose practices do not corroborate any such distinction, as 
illustrated by the landmark cases over the course of the nation’s history noted in this Essay. See 
also supra note 22 and sources cited therein (on historical judicial practices).   
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II.  HERE’S THE FUSS: THE POLITICS OF “ORIGINALISM” AS 
BACKLASH JURISPRUDENCE 
  
The big and relatively sudden “debate” over internationalism and 
constitutionalism can be traced proximately to the actions of a partic-
ular individual: Antonin Scalia, who reached out four times in eleven 
months—during 2004 and January 2005—to stir up a fuss over the 
referencing of foreign and international materials in constitutional 
analysis.  One high-profile occasion was his 2004 keynote at the An-
nual Meeting of the American Society of International Law.  In addi-
tion, during 2004 he used his dissent in Olympic Airways v. Husain, 
and then his concurrence in Sosa v. Alvarez-McChain, to inscribe his 
sentiments onto the nation’s formal legal heritage.34 Another was his 
celebrated 2005 exchange with Justice Breyer at American Universi-
ty’s Washington College of Law.35 In each instance he decried the in-
fluence of foreign and international materials in domestic legal culture 
and espoused a legal neo-isolationism in the name of “originalism” as 
method.   
Yet Justice Scalia is more than just a tad inconsistent on the par-
ticular point he has chosen to pick here: for example, a 2006 study of 
all Supreme Court opinions, before Justices O’Connor and Rehnquist 
departed, shows empirically that, in recent and current times, all of the 
justices repeatedly reference international materials in their opinions, 
including Justice Scalia.36  In fact, Justice Scalia is in the top three, tied 
with former Chief Justice Rehnquist and right behind Justices Kenne-
dy and Breyer.37  This particular inconsistency, as noted further below, 
is part of a larger pattern or record of strategic adjudication estab-
lished under the banner of “originalism” during the past two decades 
or so.38 
Despite that freighted detail, this sustained denunciation seemed 
to swell all of a sudden, and created lots of buzz, precisely because it 
issued from one of the current appointees to the Supreme Court.  This 
fuss thus illustrates the power of that office to create spectacle, if the 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., joined in pertinent 
part by O'Connor, J., dissenting); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  For a review of this chronology, see Melissa 
A. Waters, Justice Scalia on the Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation:  Unidirec-
tional Monologue or Co-constitutive Dialogue, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 150, 152-56  (2004-
2005) (providing a more detailed substantive account). 
 35 See supra note 33. 
 36 O’Brien, supra note 22, at 11 (documenting uses in each justices’ opinions). 
 37 Id. at 12-14 (setting out detailed charts). 
 38 See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (on originalism as “practice”). 
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holder has the will and wits for it.  More important to this analysis, 
however, is that in each instance Justice Scalia acted professedly and 
pointedly in the name of what he describes as originalism,39 and there-
fore the motivations behind that larger jurisprudential campaign must 
be understood so that we may situate the specific fuss in its contempo-
rary, as well as historical, context.   
While many variants of “originalism” percolate in contemporary 
legal culture, in general, the label refers to the viewpoint that would 
privilege “Framers’ intent” (and related historical indicia) as the first 
and best answer to all constitutional questions.40  As Justice Scalia, the 
most vocal proponent of this one-step approach, has argued: “Now, my 
theory of what I do when I try to interpret the American Constitution 
is I try to understand what it meant, what it was understood to mean 
when it was adopted.  And I don’t think it changes since then.”41  This 
approach would seem to freeze any “foreign” or “international” mate-
rials out of all constitutional equations.  Over time, the societal effects 
of this choice are foreseeable, if not intentional:  this choice slowly but 
surely serves to keep the nation cast in a “traditional” hierarchy 
drawn from the 1700s.42  This exclusively backward-looking choice 
does not reflect the the Framers’ own example, as already noted, nor 
does it reflect what they intended their posterity to do with their han-
diwork.  On the contrary, in Philadelphia they exchanged promises to 
keep their deliberations strictly secret and, in addition, they agreed to 
shut the windows of Independence Hall during all of that hot sum-
                                                                                                                           
 39 One example is his interweaving of originalism in the elaboration of his views on inter-
nationalism during the January 2005 exchange with Justice Breyer at American University.  See 
supra note 33, at 8-9 (using the Eighth Amendment to illustrate the point). 
 40 For one notable example, see Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN L. 
REV. 849 (1989) (arguing for originalism but allowing for “faint-hearted” originalism). This push 
toward “originalism” became a formal agenda during the 1980s.  See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, In-
terpreting the Constitution, 13 in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER 
ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed. 1990) (promoting originalist arguments as formal policy 
when Attorney General under Ronald Reagen).  Other backlashers have promoted similar 
arguments during this time, see infra note 47 and sources cited therein, even as well-established 
approaches to interpretation continue to guide contemporary constitutionalism.  See, e.g., Ste-
phen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245 (2002) (questioning contempo-
rary versions of originalism and their selective application); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The 
Constitution of the United Sates: Contemporary Ratification 23, in INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed. 1990) (rejecting 
originalism as espoused in modern times).  
 41 See supra note 33, at 8. 
 42 For more discussion of similar points, see Francisco Valdes, The Constitution of Terror: 
Big Lies, Backlash Jurisprudence and the Rule of Law in the United States Today, 7 NEV. L.J. 973 
(2007) [hereinafter Constitution of Terror].  
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mer—both actions taken for the express purpose of precluding later 
speculation amounting to this sort of constitutional gaming.43 
This type of present-day originalism consequently has been 
named a  “one-step” approach to the serious and complex business of 
constitutional interpretation.44  Under this simplistic approach, all that 
this required is for today’s appointees to peer back into the distant 
past and then re-enact whatever choices they imagine might have 
transpired in the past.  Obviously, this approach looks only backwards 
in time.  It fails, in other words, to account for complexity in the appli-
cation of texts to accomplish intended goals under ever-changing cir-
cumstances.  Rather than “interpret” the Constitution “with fidelity” 
this backward-focused approach trenchantly overlooks the necessary 
“second step” in the process of interpreting or “translating” a text for 
practical application over time and circumstance—in much the same 
way that federal judges of all persuasions have been doing routinely 
since the time of John Marshall.45 
Under this one-step approach, the nation’s government would 
not be empowered to establish and maintain an Air Force, simply be-
cause the text of the Constitution itself refers only to an Army and 
Navy, and no other evidence of “intent” is available.  Under this one-
step version of originalism and its related practices, the powers of the 
national government methodically become contracted into their nar-
rowest possible compass without regard to historical limitations or 
contemporary complexities.  Through this sort of refined and meta-
physical process, the Framers’ handiwork and hopes are made into a 
magnificent structure to look at, but totally unfit for long-term use.  
Without the second interpretive step so necessary to a workable 
framework of enduring constitutionalism, today’s originalist appoin-
tees induce doubt, thereby entangling and perplexing constitutional 
understandings that destabilize modern democratic policy choices and 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Id. at 980.  See also supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text (on historical practices).  
As is well known, the Framers took extreme pains to foreclose debates about their intent/s: “the 
sessions were to be strictly secret” and “sentries [were] planted without and within, for example.  
Indeed, “So scrupulously was the order of secrecy observed that it was not until many years 
afterward that anything definite was known of what took place in the Convention.”  MAX 
FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 57-60 (1913).   James 
Madison broke this “seal of secrecy” when he posthumously published his famous minutes from 
the Philadelphia convention—but the edits he performed first remain uncertain, so we have no 
way of verifying details that may be crucial for originalist-style efforts.  
 44 For the full exposition of this concept, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 
TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1992-93). 
 45 These points must be added to the other difficulties that render modern-style original-
ism conceptually incoherent, an incoherence already well-explained. E.g., Paul Brest, The Mis-
conceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980) (outlining some key 
defects in originalism, including conceptual as well as practical flaws). 
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help serve and preserve unjust vestiges from colonial days.   Rather 
than aid in the ongoing challenge of principled adjudication, today’s 
originalist tactics toil to fulfill John Marshall’s original prophecy. 
Under their own terms, then, prevailing versions of originalism 
fall short of the claims they boast.  Their modern-day conception of 
“intent” as a legal notion overlooks how “intent” as applied to a col-
lective decision must take into account the intentions of different ac-
tors within the collective—in this instance, the Framers.  Their simplis-
tic conception also is blind to the ways in which both individuals and 
collectives typically are motivated by mixed intentions.  This original-
ist misconception renders “intent” conceptually incoherent not only 
because it ignores the measures of the Framers to prevent this misuse 
of their debates, but also because it relies on an extreme, and perhaps 
strategic, over-simplification of an otherwise well-understood concept 
of the common law.46   
Nonetheless, one-step or modern-day originalists insist that their 
approach constrains unprincipled exercises of public power, especially 
by “liberal” federal judges too keen on “rights.”47  Thus, claims of prin-
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id.  See also supra note 43 (on other difficulties with originalist reliance on “intent” in 
constitutional contexts).  For a more extended discussion, see Valdes, The Constitution of Terror, 
supra note 42, at 977-85 (critiquing originalism’s misuse of “intent”).  Nonetheless, we must 
recognize that juridical references to Framers and their intentions do resonate throughout the 
nation’s history.  Yet, the record shows that typical historical uses and today’s originalist practices 
are not the same thing.  Though references to “Framers’ intent” percolate from the original 
generation on to today, the big difference between then and now can be boiled down, somewhat 
roughly, to this: during most of the nation’s history, Supreme Court justices and other judicial 
appointees have made frequent and mostly sloppy references to “Framers’ intent” to help rein-
force or supplement their rationales for a particular determination of law, as the landmark rul-
ings in cases like McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden help to illustrate.  See Valdes, 
The Constitution of Terror, supra note 42, at 977-85 (elaborating similar points).  
Interestingly, this historical use is somewhat similar to the historical uses of foreign and in-
ternational materials: as we saw above, foreign and international materials also are used in sec-
ondary or supplemental ways, in support of various outcomes, and with apparent sense of sys-
temic discipline.  See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text (on uses).   Similarly, as in McCul-
loch and Gibbons, judges throughout the nation’s history have invoked the intent of the Framers 
as a flourish to help solidify conclusions of law.  See Valdes, The Constitution of Terror, supra 
note 42, at 980-84 (discussing these cases and related points).  In contrast to that historical invo-
cation or use of Framers’ intent, today’s originalists seek to establish a political and legal culture 
wherein anything labeled “Framers’ intent” becomes the preferred, if not exclusive, basis for 
determining a point of law.  Under originalist accounts of original practices, the category of 
“Framers’ intent” thereby becomes deified, as well as ossified, in much the same way that the 
category “foreign and international materials” becomes demonized and suppressed.  Surface 
similarities between historical practices and revisionist originalism regarding internationalism 
(or “intent”) are just that; to understand and grapple with legitimate questions raised by interna-
tionalism (or “intent”) for American legal actors today, we must search not only deeper but also 
elsewhere.    
 47 E.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Ba-
lancing, 63 U. COLO. L.REV. 293, 293 (1992) (noting that “liberal activist judges” are the frequent 
targets of self-style originalists, who “promise that their replacements will not be so free-
 
2007] The Intersection of United States Constitutional Law . . . 15 
cipled decision-making are typical of the virtues that originalists assert 
in support of their interpretive choices, even as today’s appointees 
continue to act otherwise—like “the most activist Supreme Court in 
history.”48   This inconsistency, as we shall see next, disguises a virulent 
originalist distaste for individual constitutional rights, and a seeming 
willingness to do whatever may be necessary to contract and contain 
them, which in turn helps to explain not only the activist “anti-anti-
discrimination agenda” of originalist appointees today49 but also the 
anti-internationalist fuss that Scalia has helped to stir up in original-
ism’s name, and in pursuit of its political agenda. 
As this synopsis indicates, and despite furious conclusory asser-
tions to the contrary, modern originalism is a twentieth century inven-
tion tailored to contemporary political struggles over rights and pow-
er.  Modern-day, or one-step, originalism tries to sanctify a particular 
conception of “Framers’ intent” and to deploy that conception selec-
tively to achieve ideological imperatives.  This technique may appear 
valueless, detached and neutral through the creation of distance be-
tween now and then—by attributing what “we” do now to what the 
Framers “originally” would have done then.  This technique shifts the 
sense of choice away from today’s judicial appointees and creates an 
air of simple, cut-and-dried adjudication.  But in fact, this practice of 
so-called originalism is akin to the ploys played by the Wizard of Oz, 
hiding behind the curtain while pulling behind-the-scenes levers to 
create both commotion and control.50   
Thus, in an incisive 2006 article, Robert Post and Reva Siegel ob-
served that: 
The current ascendancy of originalism does not reflect the 
analytical force of its jurisprudence, but instead depends 
upon its capacity to fuse aroused citizens, government offi-
cials and judges into a dynamic and broad-based political 
                                                                                                                           
wheeling”).  For early influential works of originalist backlashers, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE  POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990) and RAOUL BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT  BY  JUDICIARY (1977); see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some 
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).     
 48 THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY (2004)); see also 
Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original 
Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 217 (2004) (stating that “a study of citation patterns in federal-
ism cases since 1970” found that “judges seeking the original understanding are largely uncon-
strained in their ability to mold the historical record to serve instrumental goals”); see also infra 
note 65 and sources cited therein (on judicial manipulation of legal rules to reach preferred 
results in recent decades).  
 49 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002)(on 
this terminology, and the originalist judicial opinions that give rise to it). 
 50 See, e.g., Robert P. Smith, Jr., Explaining Judicial Lawgivers, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 153 
(1983-1984) (documenting this practice). 
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movement.  To understand originalism’s power at the dawn 
of the 21st Century is to appreciate the ways in which origi-
nalism connects Constitutional law to a living, political cul-
ture and provides its proponents a compelling language in 
which to seek constitutional change through adjudication, 
as well as politics.  Political proponents of originalism 
speak to and incite groups, in order to solidify their politi-
cal mandates to reconstitute the Court.  What is truly re-
markable in assessing the performance of originalist judges 
(and here they speak specifically of Scalia and Thomas) is 
that they also engage in this same process of political mo-
bilization.  These two justices use their judicial opinions as 
conscious tools to excite the anger, fears and resentment of 
conservative constituencies and thus to fan the fires of po-
litical mobilization.51  
In short, this latest fuss about the relevance of foreign and interna-
tional materials in North American constitutionalism is an expression 
of the role that today’s new, ideologically-saturated form of original-
ism plays in the legal (and political) culture of the United States at 
this juncture in the nation’s history.   
As the preceding synopsis suggests, the context for this specific 
fuss over internationalism is originalism’s broader role or function in 
the construction of the current social, legal and political moment.  This 
role or function renders originalism a jurisprudential vehicle to help 
expedite, or at least legitimate and facilitate, a roll-back of social and 
legal developments since the famous showdown in 1937, when another 
handful of appointees wielded the power of judicial review as a per-
sonal baton.52  In the New Deal’s stead, today’s originalists envision a 
“resurrection” of discredited doctrines and old deals that (we had 
thought) the generations of the mid-twentieth century had tran-
scended.53  This anti-rights, roll-back effort, as we see next, travels un-
der the name of “culture war” or backlash kulturkampf. 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Consti-
tution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006).   
 52 For notable accounts of those times, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940 (1963); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court Packing” Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347.  
 53 The term “resurrection” denotes a return from “exile” – which, under this view, began 
with the emergence of the New Deal and has continued since then.  See Special Symposium 
Issue: The Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L. J. 1 (2001) (presenting a symposium devoted to the 
topic). 
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While the term “kulturkampf” traditionally refers to various pe-
riods in different social and political settings,54 in the United States at 
the turn of the millennium the term had come to signify the coordina-
tion of national political efforts to retrench Civil Rights and New Deal 
legacies in both social and legal terms.55  These orchestrated efforts 
span multiple categories of identity and policy, but it is no coincidence 
that twice in sexual regulation cases, Justice Antonin Scalia—again—
has raised a fuss.  Both times, he invoked the notion of “kulturkampf” 
explicitly, and each time to deride the Court’s ruling protecting a vul-
nerable social group from formal legal subordination through raw 
exercises of majoritarian might.  Dissenting from Romer v. Evans,56 
and again from Lawrence v. Texas,57 he ridiculed the majority’s analysis 
and holding as mere participation in the “culture wars” sweeping the 
United States during the last quarter of the twentieth century.  In 
doing so, Justice Scalia reminds us—again—of the times in which we 
live, of the context in which these cases have been litigated and adju-
dicated, and of the mind-set that prompts him to raise his latest fuss, 
against internationalism, in the service of the same ends. 
The stirrings of today’s “culture wars” go back to the 1970s and 
1980s when the liberal antidiscrimination initiatives of earlier decades 
were increasingly contested.58  By 1989’s Supreme Court term, Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 54 For example, culture wars and kulturkampf are associated with German politics, both 
during the Bismarckian struggle to assert secular state authority over Catholic dogma in the 
form of public policy and during the efforts of the Nazi Party to reform German culture in line 
with their racist ideology.  See generally RICHARD J. EVANS, THE COMING OF THE THIRD REICH 
118-53 (2003) (focusing on the culture wars waged in Germany as part of the Nazi rise to power). 
 55 See Francisco Valdes, Afterword—Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: 
Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality and Responsibility In Social Justice Scholarship—Or, Legal 
Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENVER U. L. REV. 1409, 1427, n. 70 (1998) (defining term and 
describing phenomenon). 
 56 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (striking down state constitutional 
amendment prohibiting municipal and local governments to protect sexual minorities under 
antidiscrimination laws).  
 57 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia J., dissenting) (striking down state law criminalizing only 
same-sex versions of identical acts).  For a further discussion of Lawrence, see supra notes 30-31 
and accompanying text. 
 58 For example, in 1969 the political strategist behind Richard Nixon’s 1968 campaign 
described a “southern strategy” designed to exploit mainstream fears and majoritarian resent-
ments of civil rights policies.  KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY 289 
(1969); see also TERREL L. RHODES, REPUBLICANS IN THE SOUTH: VOTING FOR THE STATE 
HOUSE, VOTING FOR THE WHITE HOUSE, 19-39 (2000) (arguing that strategy has been successful 
since then in propelling right-wing Republican politicians into the White House, thus shaping 
national politics). 
The abbreviated account presented below summarizes more detailed analyses on cultural 
warfare, law and identity, and legal education or consciousness, which I have elaborated else-
where.  See generally Valdes, supra note 5, (focusing broadly on three theoretical perspectives—
backlash jurisprudence, liberal legalisms and critical outsider jurisprudence—to compare their 
approaches to equality law and policy); Francisco Valdes, Afterword—“We Are Now of the 
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Thurgood Marshall was driven to observe publicly that, “the Court’s 
approach to civil rights cases has changed markedly . . . . It is difficult 
to characterize last term’s decisions as a product of anything other 
than a retrenching of the civil rights agenda.”59  Since then, the devolu-
tion has continued and accelerated.60  However, the official declaration 
of backlash kulturkampf occurred in 1992, from the podium of the 
Republican National Convention, when presidential contender Pa-
trick Buchanan declared “cultural war” for the “soul of America.”61  
And this declaration of ‘cultural war’ to justify and direct formally 
                                                                                                                           
View”: Backlash Kulturkampf, OutCrit Scholarship and Critical Legal Education, 35 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1401 (2005) (summarizing political and doctrinal structure of the culture wars); 
Francisco Valdes, Afterword—Culture by Law: Backlash as Jurisprudence, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1135 
(2005) [hereinafter Culture by Law] (focusing on liberty-privacy constitutional analysis, and the 
effects of backlash kulturkampf on constitutional privacy doctrine); Francisco Valdes, Warts, 
Anomalies and All: Four Score of Liberty, Privacy and Equality, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341 (2005) 
(focusing specifically on Lawrence v. Texas and generally on liberty-privacy as a central doctrinal 
terrain of social and legal retrenchment); Francisco Valdes, Afterword—Beyond Sexual Orienta-
tion in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality and Responsibility in Social 
Justice Scholarship—Or, Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENVER U. L. REV. 1409 (1998) 
(focusing on the implications of cultural warfare for sexual orientation scholarship specifically, 
and for all OutCrit scholars generally) [hereinafter Beyond Sexual Orientation].  These works, in 
turn, inform and are informed by related concerns or issues that form part of my larger scholarly 
agenda.  See Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice Activ-
ism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education 10 ASIAN L.J. 65 (2003) [hereinafter Criti-
cal Legal Education]; Francisco Valdes, Identity Maneuvers in Law and Society: Vignettes of a 
Euro-American Heteropatriarchy, 71 UMKC L. REV. 377 (2002); Francisco Valdes, Insisting on 
Critical Theory in Legal Education: Making Do While Making Waves, 12 LA RAZA L. J. 137 
(2001); Francisco Valdes, Race, Ethnicity and Hispanismo in Triangular Perspective: The “Essen-
tial Latina/o” and LatCrit Theory, 48 UCLA L. REV. 305 (2000);  Francisco Valdes, Outsider 
Scholars, Legal Theory and OutCrit Perspectivity: Postsubordination Vision as Jurisprudential 
Method, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 101 (2000); Francisco Valdes, Afterword—Theorizing "OutCrit" 
Theories: Coalitional Method and Comparative Jurisprudential Experience—RaceCrits, Queer-
Crits, LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 (1999); Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: 
A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory and Politics of "Sexual Orientation", 
48 HASTINGS L.J. 1193 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Rumina-
tions on Identities and Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995). 
 59 Hon. Thurgood Marshall, Transcription of Remarks, Annual Judicial Conference, Second 
Circuit of the United States, 130 F.R.D. 166, 167 (1990). 
 60 See, e.g., supra note 58 and infra notes 64-65 and sources cited therein (on backlash 
through jurisprudence).  
 61 For contemporary news accounts reporting this remarkable declaration, see Chris Black, 
Buchanan Beckons Conservatives to Come “Home,” BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 1992, at A12; Paul 
Galloway, Divided We Stand: Today’s “Cultural War” Goes Deeper than Political Slogans, CHI. 
TRIB., Oct. 28, 1992, at C1.  For a more substantive elaboration of cultural warfare in this context, 
see JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991); 
JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, BEFORE THE SHOOTING BEGINS: SEARCHING FOR DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA’S CULTURE WAR (1994).  That formal 1992 declaration was not an idiosyncratic mo-
ment, however.  Since then, the “angry white male” has emerged as the principal audience and 
beneficiary of ongoing backlash politicking.  See, e.g., Grant Reeher & Joseph Cammarano, In 
Search of the Angry White Male: Gender, Race and Issues in the 1994 Elections, in MIDTERM: THE 
ELECTIONS OF 1994 IN CONTEXT (Philip A. Klinkner ed., 1996)).  
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democratic politicking is not unique or isolated.62  Although some ob-
servers may mistake this ongoing kulturkampf for the typical sort of 
factional politics envisioned under the Constitution, it is not, as this 
brief summary suggests.  Rather, this backlash kulturkampf is a multi-
faceted yet methodical pursuit of a roll-back agenda designed to re-
establish “old deals” based on the colonial period.63  As the quotations 
above indicate, it is a war waged against specifically named minority 
communities, especially those placed under de jure disabilities during 
the colonial period, like people of color and women, and others not 
fairly represented in formal democracy as a result of traditional identi-
ty politics. 
In constitutional terms, the cumulative patterns of power and pol-
itics left in the wake of backlash kulturkampf in recent decades point 
to a judicial “anti-anti-discrimination agenda.”64 Under the cloak of 
                                                                                                                           
 62 E.g., James Kuhnhenn & Ron Hutcheson, Ashcroft is Next Political Flash Point; Partisan 
Lines are Clearly Drawn, MIA. HERALD, Jan. 11, 2001 at 1A (reporting on comments after the 
2000 presidential selection, making it clear that the naming of a new Attorney General at that 
time reflected this ongoing backlash pursuit of cultural warfare). 
 63 As this summary indicates, backlash kulturkampf is waged across three broad fronts or 
prongs, which are orchestrated to be mutually-reinforcing.  The first focuses on electoral politics, 
including direct referenda, at the local, state and national levels.  The second prong or front 
focuses on federal judicial appointments.  The third focuses on targeted uses of the federal 
spending power.  The first prong ensures control of lawmaking power, as well as the power to 
make judicial appointments.  The second then ensures that backlash lawmaking will receive 
judicial protection, rather than scrutiny.  The third enables backlashers to “starve” public pro-
grams they despise when the first or second prongs fail to do the job altogether.  As a set, this 
trio of backlash efforts systematically aims to “roll back” the New Deal and Civil Rights legacies 
of numerous Congresses and  Presidents, established democratically during the latter half of the 
past century.  See supra note 58 and sources cited therein (on the substance and structure of 
backlash kulturkampf).    
 64 Rubenfeld, supra note 49; see also Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the 
Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (1996); Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1331 (1988); Kenneth L. Karst, Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural Counterrevolution in Constitu-
tional Perspective, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 677 (1991); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Dis-
crimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1977-1978); Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 
1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75; Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical 
Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265 (1984); cf. Kevin M. Clermont, 
Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547 (2003); Kevin M. Clermont & Theo-
dore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negoti-
able Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947; William B. Gould, IV, The Supreme Court and Em-
ployment Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and Congressional Response, 64 TUL. L. 
REV. 1485 (1990); Charles R. Lawrence, III, “Justice” or “Just Us”: Racism and the Role of Ideolo-
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Framers’ intent and the like, originalist-identified appointees present 
their pursuit of this agenda innocuously but falsely as a sort of prin-
cipled adjudication, in which the chips of social and legal destiny simp-
ly fall where they belong.65  However, backlash kulturkampf amounts 
to a kind of “cultural cleansing” that aims incrementally to entrench 
“original” hierarchies and injustices as “natural” and perhaps perpe-
tual features of the nation’s social, cultural, political and economic 
landscape.  From the perspective of backlash originalism, apparently 
nothing can interfere with this neocolonial ambition—especially “for-
eign” and international influences beyond the formal control of to-
day’s appointees, which might point toward emancipatory meanings 
when translating constitutional texts.66   
Thus, backlash kulturkampf not only reflects but also projects a 
willful agenda of social and legal retrenchment in favor of neocolonial 
hierarchies.  Inevitably, and by design, the civil and other rights of tra-
ditionally-subordinated groups are the principal targets of this reac-
tive fury. This agenda, as we see immediately below, seems to drive the 
timing and content of the originalist anti-internationalist fuss as well.   
With this historical, political, and ideological background in mind, 
the question returns: “So why now?”   
Recall that Scalia stirs this particular ruckus up in 2004 and early 
2005.  What happened in 2003, immediately preceding this sudden 
tempest?  The decision in Lawrence—the ruling from which Scalia 
bitterly dissented with his second invocation of kulturkampf!67  This 
2003 case, as noted earlier, reversed Bowers, and cited to social and 
comparative study in the traditional “by-the-way” method characteris-
tic of the Court throughout history.68   This modest and traditional 
usage of international or foreign sources nonetheless made Scalia go 
on the offensive with his interventions since then, even though no sim-
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ilar furor erupted in 1986 after Bowers had relied on the same or simi-
lar sources to justify the opposite result.69  Generally, this juxtaposition 
helps to illustrate how the same methodology—referencing foreign 
and international materials—can and does cut both ways, ideological-
ly, in judicial interpretations of the United States Constitution.  More 
specifically, the juxtaposition of these two culture war cases, both in-
terpreting the Fourteenth Amendment and the limits it places on 
states’ power to regulate human sexualities, helps to bring into sharp 
relief how backlash kulturkampf works in constitutional doctrine-
making within the current Supreme Court, and under the guise of 
modern originalism.70   
In other words, the juxtaposition of internationalism (and origi-
nalist reactions to it) in these two relatively recent cases brings into 
focus the absurdity—and intellectual dishonesty—of the current fuss.  
This juxtaposition of uses, results, and reactions in these two relatively 
recent culture war cases helps to bring the crux of the fuss to center 
stage: as the 2006 empirical study of internationalism in Supreme 
Court opinions concludes, “[i]n short, what Justice Scalia adamantly 
opposes is the Court’s use of and reliance on contemporary compara-
tive judicial decisions and international legal developments when con-
struing guarantees for individual constitutionally-protected rights, es-
pecially when used to justify the protection, as opposed to the contrac-
tion or denial, of those rights.”71  The problem for originalists like Sca-
lia, then, is not internationalism.  The problem for them is, instead, 
individual rights, and, more specifically, the role of law in helping to 
protect them. 
This insight helps to make sense of the apparent inconsistency be-
tween originalist complaints and practices regarding internationalism 
and constitutionalism, and situates the current fuss in the frameworks 
devised by Rubenfeld, Post & Siegel, and others.72  This results-
oriented insight explains, as well as illustrates, the hidden politics of 
originalism as an expression of neocolonial ideology, and as a juri-
sprudential form of backlash kulturkampf.  This insight reveals that 
originalism as practice does not illuminate a principled path to consti-
tutional interpretation.  This insight, in sum, helps to bring into sharp 
relief the three-way linkages between the anti-rights bias of original-
ism, the culture wars, and the newfound attack on internationalism. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (on the two cases). 
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22 FIU Law Review [3:1 
III. BEYOND THE FUSS: TOWARD CONCEPTUAL AND  
PROCEDURAL DISCIPLINE 
 
So what now?  To serious observers, I suggest that we move 
beyond the originalist fuss, which serves to distract more than to illu-
minate.  Understanding both the historical and contemporary socio-
legal contexts for this fuss, as outlined above, I suggest that we turn to 
the serious business of answering the legitimate questions of metho-
dology and interpretation raised by international and foreign mate-
rials.  The challenges are both complex and familiar to those trained in 
law: international and foreign materials, like all sources of interpreta-
tion, are susceptible to manipulation. 
Two problems emerge at the outset, and both are well known to 
legal culture: one is haphazard use, and the other is manipulative use; 
one is unintentional, and one is intentional.  Nothing can bar a willful 
judge from doing what she wants, as the 1930s taught the nation all 
too well.73  So we can’t prevent activism, including today’s backlash 
version, except perhaps marginally by being alert and critically 
minded.  But a possible, principled, curative framework for the syste-
matic use of foreign and international materials in the adjudication of 
“domestic” disputes can be extrapolated from the history of regularity 
and modesty that precedes us regarding this topic.  Two dimensions—
one conceptual, one procedural—must be considered here. 
Conceptually, we begin with classic prudential considerations.74  
These familiar considerations counsel that a consistent methodology 
for the inclusion of international materials, whether narrowly or 
broadly construed, should be reserved for “hard cases”—for cases 
where no precedent governs and no predominant answer obtains, or 
cases presenting novel or complex questions under ambiguous texts or 
authorities.  Easy cases are, well, easy; they fall into decisional catego-
ries where a ruling and its basis can be ascertained with relative clarity.  
But hard cases call for more searching analysis.  In hard cases, compa-
rativist and internationalist analyses can illuminate the problem, and 
better inform the decision-maker’s understanding of remedial op-
tions.75   
But prudential considerations also counsel that this more search-
ing inquiry, in these relatively hard cases, should be limited to equiva-
lent contexts—and equivalence in turn has two dimensions to it.76  
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One dimension is general or structural equivalence: this dimension 
queries whether the comparative analysis employs a legal system and 
society that can be regarded as analogous to the one in this country.  
The second dimension is specific or situational equivalence: this di-
mension queries whether the case under analysis is sufficiently similar 
to the points of comparison being employed.  Thus, specific equiva-
lence focuses on situations, problems, policy issues, the question at 
hand, whereas general equivalence focuses on systems, cultures and 
societies.  Of course, these two queries are subjective.  But they go to 
the heart of lawyering—of what lawyers actually do for a living, which 
is to analogize and distinguish.  These conceptual points—the focus on 
hard cases, and on both structural and situational equivalence—thus 
set the stage for an operational model.  The second part, therefore, is 
procedural—and here the focus is on the role of the litigants, and of 
trial court judges, in problem-solving through formal adjudication.77   
Revealingly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44 invites litigants 
to give notice of their intention to raise issues involving “the law of a 
foreign country” in a domestic federal case.78  In other words, the sys-
tem itself contemplates and invites the introduction and use of foreign 
materials by litigants and judges in federal procedures.  This Rule was 
enacted in 1966 and has been amended twice since—1987 was the last 
time.  Having been with us for a while, it requires nothing new or nov-
el to note and operationalize the practices it invites.  Similarly, Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 53 instructs and empowers federal trial courts 
specifically to consider foreign and international materials in the ap-
plication of rules of law in cases and controversies subject to federal 
jurisdiction under the Constitution.79  This Rule explicitly and unquali-
fiedly authorizes federal judges to appoint a Special Master in any 
federal civil case, if the judge finds one is needed to ascertain anything 
legally relevant to its disposition, including “legal conclusions”—
anything such as international law, the law of India, the law of Eng-
land, the law of Brazil, the law of South Africa.  Finally, and still in the 
same jurisprudential and procedural vein, Federal Rule of Evidence 
706 empowers federal trial courts to appoint experts to testify regard-
ing complex questions, whether of fact or law, while adjudicating a 
federal case arising under the laws or Constitution of the United 
States—facts or laws that may include foreign and international 
sources or matters.80  So the rules both of procedure and evidence, 
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enacted specifically for the federal court system, already provide sev-
eral specific points of substantive entry for foreign and international 
materials.   
Under this arrangement, appellate judges—including those con-
trolling the Supreme Court—then have to deal with these materials in 
the same way that they have to deal with any other matter or issue 
preserved by the record in accordance with these and similar rules.  
And these rules of procedure and evidence have been promulgated 
formally by the Supreme Court itself.  Under this arrangement, at this 
stage in the nation’s history, no need for fussing exists in fact.   
Although individual members of the Court may use the power of 
their offices to create a fuss out of pique, the ensuing tempest should 
remind us of Chief Justice Marshall’s prescient warning.81  Rather than 
obscure basic and familiar knowledge, metaphysical fulminations 
should prompt us to focus on familiar foundations.  In this instance, 
Scalia’s latest fuss should remind us of these ready systemic mechan-
isms, embedded in the rules of procedure and evidence, for the use of 
foreign and international materials in federal courts.  These mechan-
isms may not settle the details about the use of any particular material 
in any particular case or manner.  But these mechanisms at least cor-
roborate that the constitutional system of this country is not automat-
ically or structurally hostile to comparativism and internationalism as 
a method.  And they provide practical mechanisms for litigants, attor-
neys, and judges across the country to continue to do so in good faith, 
as part of everyday legal practice.   
To summarize, then, the analysis outlined here counsels an ap-
proach to this topic informed by a sense both of history and of trajec-
tory, a recognition not only of tradition but also of trends—much like 
the Framers and their generation did with just about everything re-
garding this Constitution, both before and after its framing.  This ap-
proach requires a recognition that the practice of internationalism 
under U.S. constitutionalism is long and venerable, and cuts ideologi-
cally both ways over time.  Today’s noisy “debate” distracts from this 
history, thus illustrating how today’s revisionist originalism operates as 
a political practice in this particular area, at this particular time.  Ra-
ther than become entangled in the metaphysical questions that today’s 
originalists set forth, much as Chief Justice Marshall long ago warned 
us, our challenge is to fashion a principled and workable framework 
that tackles legitimate substantive issues regarding the uses of foreign 
and international sources in constitutional interpretation, much as we 
do when other kinds of questions of law and interpretation, familiar to 
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us as legal actors, arise.  Thus, the approach urged here calls upon us 
all to learn from the Framers’ original example, as well as from the 
lessons of history since then, rather than from the politicians in robes 
who now preach a revisionist history in pursuit of backlash agendas.   
CONCLUSION 
History shows a key distinction between what some judges call 
originalism today, and what the Framers originally did when they were 
in the shoes that we wear today.  The Framers and their contempora-
ries turned to multiple sources to help them discern socially wise ways 
of both framing substantive rules of law and then interpreting them in 
the process of applying them.  The Framers and their contemporaries, 
in their formal institutional capacities, employed this methodology 
before and after the Constitution; that is, incorporating these materials 
and this methodology into the original Constitution, as well as extend-
ing this incorporation through the continuation of this practice the-
reafter.  Even if we were to look to Framers’ intent with respect to 
internationalism, both in substance and in method, we would find a 
historical record that illustrates no intent that mandates the strident 
calls for knee-jerk exclusion that today’s fuss features.   
In broader context, this sudden fuss over internationalism is a stra-
tegic extension of the political and ideological clashes between the New 
Deal and the “old deals” that had defined North American law and 
society prior to the cataclysmic events of the mid-twentieth century, 
including the Great Depression and the Second World War.  Those cat-
aclysms, much like the cataclysm of the Civil War the century before, 
had redefined not only American society, but the view of American so-
ciety toward its legal order.  Thus, both historically and substantively, 
the background that creates the context for this fuss is the broader po-
litical struggle over rights and power under the “rule of law” that com-
mences on these shores in the 1780s with the debates and activities of 
the men later called the Framers of this Constitution, and continues to 
this day in the form of backlash kulturkampf and “originalist” jurispru-
dence.  With these thoughts in mind, we can return to, and conclude 
with, the momentous occasion at hand: the inauguration of the facilities 
for this new College of Law, the first public law school in South Flori-
da’s history, as part of this international university.   
The decision of the Florida Legislature to dedicate this whole uni-
versity specifically and explicitly to the study of international expe-
rience and knowledge in our multicultural society is no mistake, nor 
aberration, as the calls for legal isolationism issued by today’s original-
ists might seem to suggest.  On the contrary, this institution, explicitly 
devoted to internationalism, helps to illustrate how elected public offi-
cials, in different time periods and geographic locations, have dis-
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charged their official duties in a manner that embraces comparative 
understandings of local or “domestic” issues.  The legislative Acts estab-
lishing both this university as a whole, and this College of Law specifi-
cally, are emblematic of this history, and of the gradual development of 
a legal culture in this nation under the federal Constitution. Of course, 
these legislative Acts, and the mandate of this university and college 
under them, do not rise to a constitutional plane, nor do they illustrate 
the many types of actual or potential aspects of internationalism and 
comparativism in U.S. legal culture today.  Nonetheless, this institution, 
and the decision to establish it as such, help both to continue and to 
illustrate the broader phenomenon of internationalism and comparativ-
ism in the domestic legal culture established under the U.S. Constitu-
tion.  The dedication of this university as a whole to international and 
comparative studies thus illustrates and continues a long and varied 
history that stretches even prior to the nation’s founding.  
It is precisely because original aspirations, commitments, and val-
ues are amorphous and subjective that judges have since the founding 
of the nation returned to comparative analysis in order to distill them 
for concrete application to particular sets of facts.  But, as we have 
seen, throughout this time various legal actors have deployed compar-
ative practices in diverse settings to accomplish varied results.  As we 
have seen, our predecessors have not always arrived at outcomes that 
later generations could embrace with a sense of integrity.  Indeed, the 
same types of materials and methodology have been used to repudiate 
what the very same appeals to international or comparative sources 
had previously produced, as the juxtaposition of Bowers and Law-
rence in recent times so crisply illustrates.   
In the end, the task facing each judge—and generation—is to 
endeavor, in good faith, to employ this methodology in a manner that 
builds on the aspirations of the Framers, rather then entrenching or 
exacerbating the political limitations they were unable to transcend in 
their own day.  In the end, as this brief account indicates, the question 
now (and always) before us regarding the use of international and 
foreign materials in the interpretation of our laws is not if, but rather 
how.  And the challenge raised by this question, both historically and 
now, is whether each generation can do so in a manner that helps to 
build and reinforce aspirational, even if imperfect, commitments to 
foundational values in favor of liberty and equality.  Recent genera-
tions have already crafted some basic rules of procedure and evidence, 
and this particular legacy is part of our national legal inheritance, or 
heritage.  The challenge for each successive generation is to create a 
legacy that builds on prior generations’ gains, and that future genera-
tions will feel inclined to embrace, rather than compelled to repudiate. 
